Role of Princely Courts on Innovations in and Support of Art

Aram Sakalian, The Young Ottomans from Tanzimat to Democracy (Stamboul: Abdülhamid Academy Printing, 2011)

… The 1952 constitution and the formation of the Ottoman Union [1] was a fundamental turning point in Ottoman political history. Since the beginning of the Tanzimat in 1839, the Ottoman world had continually restructured itself, and its bodies and methods of government had changed repeatedly and oft violently. But after 1952 there were no fundamental changes in Ottoman constitutional structure: there were adjustments, certainly, simply the political system has continued to function in the aforementioned framework. This is non to say that there haven't been changes, merely the changes since the 1950s have been evolutionary rather than revolutionary.

Ane often-cited case is the role of the Sultan. In the Ottoman Union, he was no longer even the formal master executive, and laws were promulgated in the government'due south name without the need for his assent. Under the 1952 constitution, he was a state symbol and religious overlord only. Nevertheless, the fact that the Union depended on him both for internal legitimacy and its role as center of the Muslim globe gave him moral say-so and meant that he had a continuing political role: indeed, a part that was sometimes more powerful for being freed from mundane politics.

The seeds of the Sultan's new part had been planted later the 1911 revolution, when Abdülhamid II, reduced to a formal role domestically, turned his focus to diplomacy. A succession of Sultans, at present trained every bit diplomats from childhood, offered their services to resolve disputes between Muslim countries, leading to the Porte becoming almost a mini-Consistory for the Islamic world. This extended to the outermost tier of the Union, where the government in Stamboul had no political power but where the Porte'due south proposals for joint action or dispute resolution always got a respectful hearing. Many of the Sultans' diplomatic initiatives were initially proposed by the authorities, but information technology was their prestige that carried the efforts through, and every bit such, they were influential in shaping and execution of Ottoman affairs.

Too, beginning in the 1940s with the rise of the Legatum Humanitatis doctrine [ii], the Sultan increasingly became trustee of the holy places. This was formalized in the 1952 constitution, which made him protector of all holy sites within the first and 2nd tiers of the Union and the caput of a unified public Waqf. This put the holy places of all religions across everyday politics, but in another fashion, the Sultan became their political arbiter, resolving dissension among their elected governing boards and mediating betwixt them and the surrounding municipal and sanjak governments.

Last but far from least has been the Sultans' contribution to Ottoman literature, scholarship and jurisprudence. A 1965 ramble amendment took the succession out of the easily of the House of Osman and provided that new Sultans would exist elected past the ulema from eligible members of the royal family and then canonical by the Meclis. The ulema has typically chosen older members of the dynasty with proven records of religious scholarship, several of whom accept too been notable poets. These Sultans' rulings and essays on religious subjects are respected well across the Union'due south borders. The Ottoman Sultan is no longer truly a monarch, only he is still a very existent Caliph…

… The organs of authorities have likewise evolved, due to economic too as political factors. The formula for distribution of oil revenue set by the 1952 constitution has held firm and much of it has been devoted to rural evolution, leading to nearly all the commencement and second tiers of the Marriage beingness role of the developed world by the 1990s. Over time, greater wealth and interconnectedness has meant, on the one hand, a greater sense of self-sufficiency and desire for local control, and on the other manus, an increased need for cooperation with next regions. Both of these have tended to increment the second tier of the Union at the expense of the first, with more directly-governed sanjaks joining together to go autonomous vilayets. There has likewise been some motion the other manner every bit vilayets have broken up over internal disputes or sanjaks take seceded from them (the ill-blighted attempt to create a Levantine Vilayet in the 1980s being the well-nigh famous example), but where first-tier sanjaks represented more 60 percent of the Marriage's population and country surface area in 1960, they are less than 35 pct of it today.

Function of the trend toward consolidation, and one which is viewed as positive by some and worrying by others, has been the formation of vilayets amid ethnic minorities or for regional cooperation. During the 1970s, a number of sanjaks with Armenian majorities or pluralities formed a vilayet and have undertaken articulation educational, cultural and economic development projects with Armenia in the decades since. The Armenian vilayet has taken on a status similar to the Principalities of Rhodes, Samos and Republic of cyprus: a second-tier Marriage territory and thus an integral function of its constitutional construction, just one that often uses its autonomy to aggrandize ties with foreign countries. Armenia'south own accretion to the Marriage as a tertiary-tier state with defensive commitments to the Porte [three] has alleviated fears that the vilayet might represent a threat, and the courts have strictly enforced religious and ethnic equality, only given the Ottoman state'southward centrifugal tendencies during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, some Turks and Arabs nevertheless regard the minority vilayets with caution.

There accept been several constitutional measures designed to counteract potential separatism. 1, enacted in 1978, was the formation of a Federal Council to facilitate regular meetings of the vilayets and sanjaks, resolve disputes between federal units in situations where the parties are reluctant to involve the Meclis or the courts, and to promote joint action. Some other amendment in 1984 codified the areas in which vilayets and first-tier sanjaks could conduct strange policy and gave Stamboul a broader national security veto. This veto has never really been used, simply its existence has given the central authorities influence in shaping the federal units' relations with their neighbors.

A terminal subpoena affecting the Marriage's federal structure was ratified in 1996, allowing the formation of vilayets with intermediate degrees of autonomy. This was highly-seasoned to sanjaks that wanted some caste of regional cooperation merely did non desire to entrust a vilayet regime with all the powers not specifically reserved to Stamboul. Hejaz would become such a land in 1999, simply the most prominent case thus far has occurred in the Balkan provinces. In 1994, Sarajevo entered a sanjak-level cultural and tourism arrangement with Serbia [4] which, despite alert on the far right in both places, proved successful enough for other Bosnian sanjaks and even those outside Bosnia to bring together. By the early 2000s, Bulgaria also wanted in, and the governments on both sides of the border wanted to deepen their cooperation beyond what was permitted for sanjaks.

Before 1996, this would take been impossible: the independent Balkan countries had no desire to join the Ottoman Matrimony fifty-fifty in its outermost tier and the sanjaks on the Ottoman side were too diverse and fractious to form a traditional vilayet. But the amendment immune the formation of a very loose vilayet that had expanded foreign policy powers but had little part other than to be role of a Balkan treaty marriage. After much negotiation betwixt the sanjaks and involvement from the Meclis and even the Porte, such an entity was formed in 2007, and too included, for the outset time, non-territorial collectives of Serbs, Greeks and Bulgarians with autonomous cultural institutions. In 2010, Dalmatia, Romania and Croatia acceded to the framework treaties – they, too, wanted greater cooperation with the Union in a way that didn't force them to join it – and information technology appears that the Balkans may be the next emerging regional grouping …

… Socially, the Ottoman Union continued to exist turbulent during the 1950s and 60s, The country reform struggles connected, and although democracy leveld the playing field, it was non in itself a solution. Politics in rural districts remained every bit volatile every bit it had been in the 1940s – sometimes more so, now that local elites couldn't stop organized slates of peasant activists from seeking power – and municipal and sanjak elections were often tearing. During the 1970s, when the recession threatened both tenant farmers and smallholders, the federal government intervened, earmarking a portion of oil revenues to purchase country and to shore up agricultural cooperatives. This resulted in land politics becoming somewhat less antagonistic and resulted in millions of dunams being distributed to individuals and cooperatives, only land reform is an ongoing process; in the concurrently, many of the zu'ama feudal families accept directed their resources into business concern and remain influential.

The countryside has also been affected by the spread of mass culture from the cities, with television condign widespread throughout the Marriage by the 1970s and new media increasingly prevalent later the 1990s. This has led to a refuse in the influence of traditional authorization figures, both religious and within the family unit, and has too resulted in the spread of feminism well beyond the cautious version that existed in rural areas after the 1911 revolution. For the nigh part, this has taken identify on a level exterior politics – every bit in Persia, the increase in educational and job opportunities for rural women has made them more than economically independent and culturally influential – but it has crossed into the political realm on a number of occasions when equality legislation has met vigorous opposition. This has been a regional divide besides as one between the city and the land, and opposition to social change was i of the main factors that motivated the formation of the Hejaz vilayet, leading to stormy legislative debates and clashes between the vilayet government and the courts…

… The Union era has been marked by simultaneous Ottomanist and local revivals. In Stamboul and in other major cities, mass culture and earlier literary and cinematic traditions [5] take congenital a truly national artistic tradition, consciously drawing from all the Union's cultures and favoring grand epics and broad regional themes. At the same time, many of the same places, and others, explored new ways to express local cultural traditions and made use of local languages, history and symbolism. The localist revivals were often sponsored by the vilayets or democratic institutions: the Chayat Haaretz movement, whose cultural and educational entities were granted ramble condition in 1982, promoted Hebrew literature and movie house extensively, while the Mesopotamian vilayet did the same for works that expressed cultural Arabism. But the national and local artistic movements take sometimes overlapped, with groups as diverse as Bosnian Muslims, Lebanese Maronites and Baghdadi Jews taking role in both. And both have, at diverse times, been influenced by political and religious currents, with socialism, feminism, religious reformism and the peasant movement all having their impact.

These trends take not been confined to the fine arts. Where culture and fine art collaborate with folkways, such as cuisine and interior design, the combination of mass media, mobility and deepening involvement have placed local traditions and the emerging national fusion in continuous dialogue. Turkish styles of architecture and design may be found in the Hejaz and traditionally Arab ones in Sarajevo; the cuisines of the Union's many minorities are oftentimes establish together around the table; and Sunni, Shi'ite, Jewish and Christian celebrations are public occasions for the entire land. In every way, the integral Ottoman world is becoming more of a union, but it is and will be a union of singled-out parts…

Renzo Zarrouk, N Africa in a Post-Westphalian World (Tunis: Mediterranean, 2015)

… Past the 1950s, Arab republic of egypt had fully recovered from the Nile War. After a turbulent starting time, the Nile Authority [6] had won the public trust and achieved an amicable and fair distribution of h2o resources. The Peace Railroad from Alexandria to Kampala, which would somewhen form a link in a concatenation of freight railways that extended all the way to Cape Town, additional regional trade and brought Egyptian companies to Kush, Buganda and E Africa even as Ethiopian and Baganda investment flowed n. The catamenia of money and trade was joined by a menses of people, as East Africans and Somalis sought work in the industrial cities of Lower Arab republic of egypt. Like every Egyptian government since Riyad Pasha'southward, the postwar governments were influenced by neo-Mu'tazilite reformism [seven] and invested heavily in educational activity, scientific research and industrial evolution, sponsoring advances in desert agriculture and taking office in the global development of loftier-yield crops.

Egyptian nationalism softened somewhat during this period, equally the bloody lesson of the Nile War and the emerging era of regionalism sank in. This manifested itself not only in the newly cooperative relationship with neighboring countries merely in domestic cultural policy. The nationalism of the Egyptian Republic had always been inclusive of minorities, calling them an aboriginal and indispensable part of Egypt's heritage, but through the 1940s, this came at the price of pressure level to assimilate and an official skepticism (admitting not a ban) toward minority cultural institutions. The assimilationist policies were steadily scaled back during the 1950s through 70s, and past 1980, the only one that remained was the police force requiring Arabic to be the universal medium of instruction: Greek, Armenian and Italian literature and art flourished, and minority institutions operated without restriction and were consulted past the government on cultural matters. At the same time, the Upper Egyptian and Sudanese communities in the northern cities swelled to hundreds of thousands and so millions, adding their own element to the cultural mix.

The emerging Egypt was withal a politically and economically centralized state, with Cairo holding an eighth of the population and nearly all meaningful government institutions, and with Cairo, Khartoum and the Nile Delta cities accounting for 90 per centum of industrial output. But outside the political realm, its centralism was fast declining…

… Egypt's interest in scientific and industrial development brought it into increasing contact with its western neighbor. Bornu's growing oil wealth, its vulnerability to climate alter and need for water security, and its country-Belloist ideology of the mutual good, all inclined information technology toward large engineering science projects, and Arab republic of egypt's neo-Mu'tazilism and its own water conservation needs inclined it the same way. Between the 1960s and 1980s, the two countries collaborated in expanding the pipeline from the Nubian fossil aquifer, drawing its water for thirsty Egyptian and Libyan cities and using information technology to replenish Lake Chad. Both also engaged in joint desalination and water treatment projects, developing many of the technologies that are used in desert countries today.

Not all the megaprojects met with success. The Aswan Dam, while greatly beneficial for Egyptian industry, has had adverse furnishings on soil salinity and has necessitated plush drainage works in the affected regions. The same gene stalled Bornu's attempt to dig a hydroelectric canal to the Sabkhat Ghuzayyil depression: an alarming ascension in the salinity of coastal soil halted the project in 1994 and forestalled any attempt to replicate the project in Qattara, although a smaller canal continues to pb seawater to evaporation ponds for chemical harvesting. Thus far, also, Bornu'south plan to build an enormous solar farm in the Sahara has proven economically unfeasible, although the technologies developed during the class of failed efforts have made Bornu a leader in solar energy development, and the projects themselves (in which about all citizens have participated via their public labor obligation) have contributed to a sense of achievement…

… People's democratic republic of algeria found that information technology was pulled in ii directions as much after becoming an democratic overseas territory as before. Five million people of full or partial Algerian descent lived in metropolitan France or the overseas departments in 1970, and that number had increased to 8 million by 2010, which meant that nearly every Algerian family unit had i or more members elsewhere in France. The Algerian economic system was thoroughly integrated into the French 1, with Algiers and Oran departments exceeding the median French living standard in 1994. The future Napoléon VII's 1975 marriage to Zohra Benyahia, who he had met at the Sorbonne, was the social event of the yr, and meant that subsequently 1998, French republic had an empress from a prominent Oran family of Arab and Spanish beginnings. A third referendum in 1985 saw support for total independence drop to 21 percent, and since then, the argue has largely been between maintaining the status quo and inbound an association relationship similar to that between Kazembe and Germany or Tunisia and Italy.

At the same time, Algerians reached for a leadership position among the nations of the Maghreb. Every bit early as the 1960s, the Algerian government reached agreements with the neighboring countries on cultural and educational exchanges and regional water management [eight]; these deepened in the 1970s and 80s, and i of the few real disputes between Paris and Algiers during this period was the extent of the latter'due south foreign relations authority. The devolution of cocky-authorities to Algeria was a compromise of France's historic centralism, simply Paris kept tight hold of political and economic relations with strange countries, and it was non until 1992 that Algeria won the power to brand trade and development deals and to move toward a unified Maghrebi road and rail network.

On an unofficial level, there were many fewer obstacles to cooperation. As the largest regional economy, People's democratic republic of algeria became the financial eye of the Maghreb, and its universities attracted students from Morocco, Tunisia and the Rif Republic. This would affect domestic politics – as the Rif had brought Abacarist ideas domicile from People's democratic republic of algeria at the turn of the twentieth century, the Algerian left was influenced by Rif radicalism at the turn of the 20-get-go – and information technology besides gave rise to a cultural move that combined the pan-Maghrebi ideas of the 1930s and 40s with the futurism of Paris. Since 2000, the studios and workshops of Algiers and Oran have get centers of the Maghrebi avant-garde…

… Morocco contested Algeria's merits to leadership of the region. Algeria was richer, but Kingdom of morocco was more populous, and although its venerable monarchy had yielded to ramble rule, information technology was the region'southward oldest continuously-existing state. Moroccan traditionalism was a counterpoint to Algerian futurism, and Morocco's universities and cultural institutions competed with Algeria's for prestige in the Maghreb and the globe. Kingdom of morocco, too, was more active in promoting Berber linguistic communication and culture than Algeria was, and although Arabic remained the prestige language, the Berber languages were used for teaching by the 1980s and a Berber and Darija literature was showtime to develop.

But Morocco was not as economically dynamic equally Algeria or Tunisia, and its relative lack of industrialization and modernistic infrastructure meant that information technology lagged farther backside and that opportunities for graduates were hard to come past. This underemployment combined with increasingly easy mobility meant that, by century's end, Morocco was suffering a brain bleed: its universities were world-form, but their alumni were as likely to live in Paris, Timbuktu or Dakar equally in Casablanca or Fez. A growing tourism industry and the beginnings of a local data sector were offset to stem the exodus by 2010, merely it is still uncertain how many graduates these industries will be able to absorb…

… And the Kingdom of the Arabs – or Tinariwen ("the Deserts"), as it was chosen subsequently 1974 – was where past and future met. In 1970, it already had the highest per-capita income in the globe, and after a moderate retrenchment during the recession, information technology became even richer during the 1980s and 90s. This did nothing to stop the anomie and resentment of foreign workers that existed amongst many of the younger generation. The authorities'south effort to protect traditional ways of life through subsidized luxury nomadism reached absurd heights, with many tribes living in a fashion that resembled motorized royal caravans and having access to the world's entertainment and educational resources via satellite media, just this had worn thin amid young people past the turn of the century, and the regime jobs offered to them as an culling were also unattractive. In the 1990s, and increasingly during the 2000s, Tinariwen experienced its own brain drain, every bit university-educated citizens took their subsidies and went to find more fulfilling jobs in Algiers or Dakar.

The Shelterers – the anti-technological communities that were the other alternative for those who wanted to opt out of the kingdom's society [9] – likewise grew. Many of the new recruits were educated, which meant that the Shelterer villages and peri-urban neighborhoods became centers of anti-modernist literature and art, but they too added to the motion's fanaticism. The terrorism that had already existed before 1960 among a minority of Shelterers became more widespread and effective, leading to an increase in repression. Shelterer communities were increasingly monitored and restricted, and the bulk who condemned the violence but refused to cooperate with the authorities were treated as if they too were terrorists. By the late 1980s, the Shelterers had largely been driven out of the cities: some went to Mali or the Toucouleur Empire where they were more tolerated, and others retreated to the deep desert and tried to evade both government patrols and their own more than fanatic brethren. In the meantime, the militants among them expanded their targets from oil wells and Tinariwen regime buildings to the countries that were helping to fight them: the outset Shelterer bombing in Algiers occurred in 1998, and by 2005 there had been attacks in Timbuktu, Bornu and Paris.

Tinariwen today shows the two faces of wealth: its people are fabulously rich, but their society still has difficulty coming to terms with the changes that wealth has brought. The government has recently begun to recognize the demand to provide ameliorate life opportunities for young people, and has announced programs to diversify the economic system and to bring scientific and creative jobs to the country. To do so, though, it will have to find a modus vivendi with the Shelterers, and with the moderate Shelterer communities alienated from the country and victory over the fanatics proving elusive, that will not be easy. Maybe the Shelterers further to the southward, who are meliorate integrated into their societies – specially those in the Toucouleur Empire, whose jurisprudence has been influential in Tinariwen for generations – can be the span, if enough people within Tinariwen are willing to cross it…

Ali Faraj al-Jaber, The Khaleejis (Abu Dhabi: Jumhuriya, 2014)

… For the emirates of the Western farsi Gulf, the nineteenth century lasted well into the twentieth. The Trucial Coast came under British suzerainty in 1820, and Bahrain and Qatar during the 1860s, simply the emirates were internally self-governing and British political and administrative ideas had petty impact. Nor, due to their isolation, were they swept by the currents of Islamic reformism that were taking shape in Africa, Republic of india and the Ottoman earth. They were well-nigh untouched by the Great State of war, and even the Imperial era passed them by with the exception of a troop levy (mostly filled by slaves) to fight in the Indian War of Independence. A traveler who visited Abu Dhabi or Bahrain in the 1930s would detect life little different from a century before.

The timeless façade that such a traveler would run into, however, was already deceptive: nether the surface, corking changes were under way. Oil exploration in Qatar and Bahrain had begun before the Indian war, and commercial exploitation commenced in 1927; in Abu Dhabi and Dubai, further exploration would lead to the development of commercial wells in the late 1940s and early 50s. This would bring new wealth to countries that had traditionally subsisted on pearling and herding, and as importantly, would bring strange workers by the thousands. By 1960, there were as many Baloch, Somali and East African workers in the oil emirates as in that location were native-built-in people, and the influx showed no sign of slowing.

Ideas were likewise coming to the Trucial Coast, filtering in from the prophetic Ibadis of East Africa and from the desert Bedouins who had begun to develop a Wahhabi-inflected Belloism based on tribal communities every bit early on every bit the 1870s. [x] These would gain their start buy in Fujairah and Kalba, emirates in the eastern part of the Trucial Declension which had split off from Sharjah during the early twentieth century. Fujairah had an independent-minded ruler who saw Belloism as a means of resisting Majestic-era bullying; Kalba, even more remarkably, was ruled de facto by an Due east African slave named Ali between 1911 and 1952. In 1937, after the sheikh died without adult sons, Ali was named regent, and connected to do influence fifty-fifty after the new sheikh'south majority. [11] Among other innovations, Ali abolished slavery, incorporating slaves equally members of their former owners' tribes; this would be replicated in Fujairah during the early 1940s. His state was puritanical, in keeping with Wahhabi austerity, but information technology emphasized both religious and secular educational activity, and those who had previously been at the bottom of the tribal hierarchy now had a run a risk to rise on merit.

However more radical changes were in shop for the oil emirates, where foreign workers began to unionize in the 1930s and were demanding the rights of citizenship past 1960. Initially, the sheikhs banned unions and repressed popular movements harshly, but that was an increasingly untenable position to have in the evolving British empire of the time. By the 1950s, the Qatari government, somewhat similar Liberia, tried to contain the strange workers into its society past adopting them into the existing tribal structure; Dubai, under a relatively frontwards-looking sheikh, granted selective naturalization to educated workers and allowed the unions, along with local notables, a place on his informational board.

In Bahrain and Abu Dhabi, which had withdrawn from the British sphere after the empire converted itself into a commonwealth, a catamenia of cautious opening in the 1940s was followed by repression. By this time, though, strange workers were a majority in Abu Dhabi, and their unions, led by Due east Africans and inspired past the prophetic Ibadism of Zanzibar, had a strong clandestine arrangement. In Bahrain, immigrant oil workers were a minority, only they had begun to build alliances with the indigenous Shi'a bulk which was inspired past the Western farsi left.

In 1968, afterwards protests over working conditions spiraled into violence, revolution swept Abu Dhabi: the 8 Emirates of the Trucial Declension were now seven emirates and one republic, and the state had transformed overnight from a tribal sheikhdom to a modernist polity that was every bit much East African, Baloch and Sindhi as Arab. Bahrain had its revolution in 1977, triggered by the Persian one two years earlier and with much of its arms coming from the Western farsi religious left; equally in Abu Dhabi, the conditional government alleged universal citizenship and elected a multi-ethnic chiffonier, although here, Shi'a Arabs were firmly in the majority.

The revolutions prepare the stage for much of what has happened in the Persian Gulf since then. The Bahraini republic has not always been a happy one: the descendants of Sunni and Ibadi oil workers have sometimes clashed with the Shi'a, and with only a few exceptions, politics break down along ethnic and tribal lines. There are signs that this is changing: in the most recent elections, multiethnic leftist and liberal parties (the latter led by a Bahraini Jew whose family had originally arrived from Baghdad in 1879) combined to take 40 pct of parliamentary seats, and the universities and mixed urban neighborhoods have become something of a cultural leveler. Economical diversification, which some say has made Bahrain the Singapore of the Gulf, has likewise brought the different ethnic groups together, although for some, the changes brought on by industrialization and tourism are a stride also far.

In Abu Dhabi, the commonwealth has been more than harmonious, and interethnic relations have progressed to the betoken where mixed marriages are common, but this has come up at the price of being a de facto single-party state, with the United Labor Party dominating every election since the revolution. This has predictably led to the evolution of a rentier country with widespread abuse and political fiefdoms, albeit tempered by labor ideology and Ibadi conceptions of the common good. Again, there are signs that this is changing – in the 2011 election, the ruling party lost its ii-thirds majority, and independent media and schools have grown in number – but the political party is fighting back, and the country seems probable to enter a new era of political conflict.

The existence of the republics has, in plow, put force per unit area on the remaining emirates to democratize, especially the ones with big immigrant populations. Both Dubai and Qatar moved toward formal democracy in the 1980s and 90s, aided by the degree to which the immigrant elites had already been incorporated into the local power structures. The emirs, both having taken the title of male monarch past this time, retained the whip hand, but ceded more ability to elected parliaments and courts, and in Dubai's case, completed the process of naturalizing those immigrant workers who satisfied residence and Standard arabic-language qualifications. In the eastern emirates, which were little touched by oil wealth and immigration, society remains bourgeois – the formal abolition of slavery in Sharjah did non occur until 1981 – but fifty-fifty hither, there has been movement toward elected advisory councils, and several of the sheikhs accept sought to emulate the consensus government that has grown upwardly in Kalba and Fujairah. These states are the poorest in the region, and the journey to modernity – especially for women and the traditional lower classes – remains a long one, only the starting time steps take been taken…
_______

[ane] See mail 5352.

[ii] See posts 5147, 5153 and 5154.

[3] Come across postal service 6749.

[iv] See mail 6563.

[5] See mail service 3232.

[half-dozen] See post 4890.

[7] See posts 1099 and 3402.

[eight] See postal service 6208.

[nine] Come across post 6208.

[10] Run across post 553.

[11] Lest I be accused of an overactive imagination, this is nearly OTL: an Eastward African slave named Barut was governor of Kalba for many years, and in 1937, the local notables chose him as regent but he was vetoed past Britain. He continued to serve as governor of the urban center into the early 1950s. A couple of the Trucial sheikhs were almost Imperial Roman in the mode they entrusted administration to the slaves of their household.

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Source: https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/mal%C3%AA-rising.226788/page-339

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